Conceptual Engineering and Legal Discourse: New Methods of Concept Evaluation Conceptual Engineering and Legal Discourse: New Methods of Concept Evaluation

SW 84- Conceptual Engineering and Legal Discourse: New Methods of Concept Evaluation

Conceptual Engineering and Legal Discourse: New Methods of Concept Evaluation

Convenors: Pawel Banas; Wojciech Grabon; Marcin Wozny;Marcin Matczak 

Contact: p.banas@uw.edu.pl.

 

In this special workshop we aim to focus on the notion of conceptual engineering and its application to various problems in legal and political theory. By conceptual engineering we mean the project of evaluating and improving our representational devices—such as our concepts—a process that manifests itself in our linguistic practices. In Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (2018), Herman Cappelen argues that conceptual engineering should not be understood merely as the revision of isolated concepts, but rather as a broader practice of assessing and reshaping the linguistic tools through which we think, argue, and coordinate social practices.

Legal discourse provides a particularly productive domain for examining the ambitions and limits of conceptual engineering. Legal systems rely on a network of normative concepts—such as, for example responsibility, intent, harm, consent, and personhood—that structure legal reasoning, legislative drafting, and judicial interpretation. At the same time, these concepts are historically layered, contested, and often strategically deployed in legal and political argument. Recent technological developments, including large language models (LLMs) and their increasing use in legal contexts, introduce additional challenges for understanding and maintaining the conceptual frameworks of contemporary legal systems. Legal discourse is also increasingly shaped by broader social and political transformations— e.g. the rise of populist movements and increasing polarization—which frequently involve attempts to redefine or strategically reshape key legal and political concepts. As Cappelen emphasizes, conceptual disputes frequently aim not only to describe social reality but also to reshape the normative frameworks within which institutions operate.

In this workshop we seek to explore how the framework of conceptual engineering can illuminate the dynamics of legal discourse and legal change. Drawing on Cappelen’s work, we invite contributions that analyze how legal actors engage in conceptual revision and contestation when interpreting statutes, developing legal doctrines, or responding to new social and technological challenges.

In many legal contexts, disagreements about the law are intertwined with disagreements about the appropriate meaning and use of key terms. Debates about the scope of consent, the legal status of personhood, or the notion of harm in regulation all involve attempts to reshape the conceptual framework within which legal judgments are made.

The workshop aims to bring together philosophers and legal theorists to examine questions such as:

• How can conceptual engineering help us understand conceptual change in legal discourse?
• Do courts, legislators, and legal scholars engage in practices resembling conceptual engineering?
• What normative and institutional constraints shape conceptual revision in law?
• What methodological approaches— theoretical or empirical—are most appropriate for studying conceptual change in legal discourse?
• What models, case studies, or comparative examples of conceptual change in legal systems around the world can illuminate the mechanisms and consequences of conceptual engineering in practice?

By situating legal discourse within the broader project of conceptual engineering, the workshop aims to foster dialogue between philosophy of language and legal theory while assessing whether conceptual engineering can help clarify and improve the conceptual foundations of legal practice.

We invite potential contributors to submit max 500-word-long abstracts of their talks no later than June 10, 2026, to p.banas@uw.edu.pl. Notifications of acceptance will be sent on a rolling basis, no later than June 15, 2026.

In this special workshop we aim to focus on the notion of conceptual engineering and its application to various problems in legal and political theory. By conceptual engineering we mean the project of evaluating and improving our representational devices—such as our concepts—a process that manifests itself in our linguistic practices. In Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (2018), Herman Cappelen argues that conceptual engineering should not be understood merely as the revision of isolated concepts, but rather as a broader practice of assessing and reshaping the linguistic tools through which we think, argue, and coordinate social practices.

Legal discourse provides a particularly productive domain for examining the ambitions and limits of conceptual engineering. Legal systems rely on a network of normative concepts—such as, for example responsibility, intent, harm, consent, and personhood—that structure legal reasoning, legislative drafting, and judicial interpretation. At the same time, these concepts are historically layered, contested, and often strategically deployed in legal and political argument. Recent technological developments, including large language models (LLMs) and their increasing use in legal contexts, introduce additional challenges for understanding and maintaining the conceptual frameworks of contemporary legal systems. Legal discourse is also increasingly shaped by broader social and political transformations— e.g. the rise of populist movements and increasing polarization—which frequently involve attempts to redefine or strategically reshape key legal and political concepts. As Cappelen emphasizes, conceptual disputes frequently aim not only to describe social reality but also to reshape the normative frameworks within which institutions operate.

In this workshop we seek to explore how the framework of conceptual engineering can illuminate the dynamics of legal discourse and legal change. Drawing on Cappelen’s work, we invite contributions that analyze how legal actors engage in conceptual revision and contestation when interpreting statutes, developing legal doctrines, or responding to new social and technological challenges.

In many legal contexts, disagreements about the law are intertwined with disagreements about the appropriate meaning and use of key terms. Debates about the scope of consent, the legal status of personhood, or the notion of harm in regulation all involve attempts to reshape the conceptual framework within which legal judgments are made.

The workshop aims to bring together philosophers and legal theorists to examine questions such as:

• How can conceptual engineering help us understand conceptual change in legal discourse?
• Do courts, legislators, and legal scholars engage in practices resembling conceptual engineering?
• What normative and institutional constraints shape conceptual revision in law?
• What methodological approaches— theoretical or empirical—are most appropriate for studying conceptual change in legal discourse?
• What models, case studies, or comparative examples of conceptual change in legal systems around the world can illuminate the mechanisms and consequences of conceptual engineering in practice?

By situating legal discourse within the broader project of conceptual engineering, the workshop aims to foster dialogue between philosophy of language and legal theory while assessing whether conceptual engineering can help clarify and improve the conceptual foundations of legal practice.