About The Workshop
SW 76- Liability: Problem of Attributing Responsibility
Convenors: Elif Gökşen; Elif Topuz; Ömer Faruk Deligönül
Contact: elif.goksen@bilkent.edu.tr
This special workshop aims to explore various approaches to legal liability, a concept that differs immensely in different legal disciplines. The variations in this regard are proof of both the difficulties in attributing responsibility and the necessity for a comprehensive philosophical discussion.
Multiple liability standards have been proposed in the legal doctrine. These most certainly owe their variety to disciplinary differences: undoubtedly a lower threshold is necessary in tort law than criminal law due to the severity of the outcomes, or the contributions have to be more complex in state responsibility compared to individual responsibility. However, these differences do not constitute such major factors as to deem standardization unachievable. If the two main pillars of liability, namely causality and culpability, can adequately be outlined with a philosophical approach, minimal normative restrictions could be adequate to provide for these requirements.
Causality constitutes the objective connection between the behavior of an agent and a specific outcome. The determination, nature, and fundamental characteristics of this causality require a factual examination in which multiple disciplines will be involved. Different normative criteria are used in defining the causal link in various legal systems and different legal fields such as tort law, criminal law, and international law. There is an ontological common point existing at the foundation of these criteria. A fundamental analysis regarding this factual causality can be made with a comprehensive philosophical approach. By researching whether structural tests such as the sine qua non, NESS, or INUS conditions can provide a universally applicable foundation, a consistent factual threshold regarding discipline-specific legal policies can be established.
Culpability embodies the subjective and moral dimension of liability and provides a normative justification for the application of legal consequences. In other words, culpability fills the gap between causality and true moral blameworthiness. With a philosophical analysis to be made in this field, the entire spectrum of fault ranging from intent, recklessness, negligence, and even strict liability must be addressed, and how moral agency, autonomy, and societal expectations shape the degree of liability should be evaluated. By systematizing these philosophical justifications regarding culpability, a consistent model explaining how the agent’s mental state and moral fault constitute a basis for liability in varying degrees across different fields can be put forward.
By gathering scholars from a multitude of legal backgrounds, this workshop aims to put forward a common denominator for liability that adequately represents the moral philosophy behind attribution.
Potential subjects include but are not limited to:
- Liability as a philosophical concept
- Liability in Tort Law
- Liability in Criminal Law
- Liability in Public International Law
- Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law
- Liability in various domestic legal systems
- Causality and culpability standards
- Causality and mens rea
- Circumstances that interfere with the causal nexus
