About The Workshop
Janaina Matida
Janaina Matida is a Postgraduate Professor at the Brazilian Institute of Education, Development and Research. She holds a PhD in Law from the University of Girona (Spain, thesis awarded sobresaliente cum laude), and both a Master’s and a Bachelor’s degree in Law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). She is co-leader of the Research Group on Applied Epistemology to the Courts (GREAT) and a consultant for the research project “Prova sob Suspeita” (“Evidence under Suspicion”) at the Institute for the Defense of the Right to Defense (Instituto de Defesa do Direito de Defesa – IDDD). She is also a Visiting Professor at the Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile. A former law clerk (assessora) to of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) in Brazil, she currently practices as a criminal defense lawyer.
Leandro De Brasi
Leandro De Brasi is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Science, School of Education, Social Science and Humanities, University of La Frontera, Chile. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of London, King’s College London. His main area of research is contemporary analytic epistemology, including its social, political, and legal branches, as well as the normative theory of democracy. His work has resulted in a number of publications in international journals, and he has participated as a speaker in various national and international conferences. He has been awarded competitive research grants as Principal Investigator. Among other topics, he is currently studying epistemic injustices related to the assessment of expert evidence in the Law.
Rachel Herdy
Rachel Herdy is an Associate Professor at the Departament of Legal Theory, National Faculty of Law, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. She holds a Bachelor’s degree (2003) and a Master’s degree (2006) in Law from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, and a Doctorate (2011) in Sociology from the State University of Rio de Janeiro. From August 2008 to August 2009, she received a PhD scholarship from the Internship Abroad Doctorate Program of the Brazilian Federal Government, which enabled her to spend one year as a Visiting Researcher at the University of Miami School of Law, under the supervision of Susan Haack. In 2011, she joined the Department of Legal Theory of the National Faculty of Law at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, where she holds a tenured position. From August 2016 to August 2017, she was on sabbatical leave conducting postdoctoral research as a Visiting Researcher at the Argumentation Laboratory (ArgLab) of the Institute of Philosophy, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. From 2022 to 2025, she served as Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Universidad Adolfo Ib..ez (UAI), in Vi.a del Mar, Chile. In 2025, she resumed her position as Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Her research focuses on Philosophy of Law, with particular interests in Legal Epistemology, Philosophy of Expertise, Expert Evidence, Evidence Law, Argumentation Theory, Legal Theory, and Pragmatism (especially the philosophy of CharlesS. Peirce). Her current researches examine judicial and policy decisions based on expertise and, more recently, epistemic injustices in evidential reasoning. She is co-leader of the Research Group on Applied Epistemology to the Courts (GREAT) and the Inter-institutional Group on Philosophy and Theory of Law (GIFT), and a member of the Red Latinoamericana de Epistemología Jurídica.
Rationale of the SW
The objective of this Special Workshop is to examine how judicial epistemic practices can go wrong and the kinds of harms—both epistemic and legal—that may result. We invite contributions that explore the phenomenon of epistemic injustice in legal reasoning, encompassing theoretical analyses, operative mechanisms, case studies, and broader epistemic and legal implications. Epistemic injustice arises from prejudice, willful ignorance, and other cognitive or structural distortions that prevent certain individuals or groups from participating fully in the production and transmission of knowledge. These distortions, often rooted in social oppression, are reproduced through epistemic practices that discredit, overcredit, silence, or otherwise misrepresent the testimony and perspectives of marginalized people. Since Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), the concept has become central in social epistemology. Scholarship inspired by feminist epistemology, critical race theory, Marxist analysis, and postcolonial thought has expanded its scope, deepening our understanding of how knowledge practices sustain injustice. More recently, these debates have gained traction in the legal domain, prompting analyses of how epistemic injustices shape judicial reasoning, especially in evidentiary assessment and decision-making.
This workshop seeks to foster interdisciplinary dialogue on how structures of domination and exclusion influence who is heard, believed, and understood in legal contexts. We welcome papers addressing, among other topics:
- Testimonial injustices, including unfair downgrading or inflation of credibility in evaluating witnesses, victims, or experts.
- Agential testimonial injustices, where one’s epistemic agency is bypassed, subverted, or exploited.
- Hermeneutical injustices, arising from the lack of interpretive tools to make sense of social experiences (e.g., sexual violence, domestic abuse, healthcare, or trans identity).
- Interactions among different forms of epistemic injustice.
- Legal and institutional mechanisms that perpetuate or mitigate epistemic harms.
- Forms of epistemic reparation and their potential to restore credibility, voice, or understanding.
No specific methodology or framework will be privileged. The workshop welcomes both analytical and practice-oriented contributions aimed at understanding and transforming judicial epistemic practices.
Participation
If you wish to participate, send an anonymized abstract (350-500 words) to epistemicinj.ivr@gmail.com until March 15, 2026. All participants will be expected to circulate an extended version of their submitted abstract at least 2 weeks prior to the Congress
